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This paper develops a theory of the ﬁrm, and equilibrium credit rationing mech-
anisms in oligopoly with R&D-product market competition. Credit rationing
arises from a hold-up problem between wealth-constrained entrepreneurs and ex-
ternal investors. Underinvestment occurs if entrepreneurial wealth constraint is
binding, even though the equilibrium corporate governance structure addresses
the hold-up problem optimally. In a symmetric equilibrium outcome all ﬁrms
face equitable credit-size rationing. In contrast the asymmetric equilibrium
outcome sees some ﬁrms (the ‘preys’) denied external credits entirely while the
others (the ‘predators’) receiving more favorable ﬁnances, which turns out to
increase market concentration and overall R&D investments.
Key words: credit rationing, oligopoly, hold-up, corporate governance, the-
ory of the ﬁrm, market structure, predation1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There has been a growing concern among economists that the simplistic view of
a ﬁrm as a proﬁt-maximizing ‘black box’ may be inadequate for understanding
corporate investment behavior. For example, long term and technically complex
investments, such as research and development projects, are known to involve
many contracting diﬃculties which can not be addressed by the ‘black-box’
theory of the ﬁrm. A gap in external ﬁnance for R&D has long been documented
by economists. This ﬁnding can trace its origin back as far as Schumpeter (1942),
and was more fully articulated by Arrow (1962) and subsequent researchers.
It identiﬁes a discrepancy between the private return to a ﬁrm and the cost
of capital when the innovation investor and ﬁnancier are diﬀerent economic
agents1.S m a l l a n d s t a r t - u p ﬁrms in R&D-intensive industries are found to
suﬀer most from such a funding gap, relying heavily on internal funding for R&D
investments (Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)). (See Hall (2002) for a recent
survey of the literature on this topic.) The R&D funding gap literature is in tune
with a larger empirical literature which provides widely spread evidence that
corporate investments are positively correlated with internal ﬁnances (i.e., cash
ﬂows)2, suggesting credit constraints from external capital markets, particularly
for small start-up ﬁrms (see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hubbard
(1998)). It seems fair to claim that the problem of credit constraints in relation
to corporate investments has formed a prominent challenge to the theory of the
ﬁrm.
While the empirical literature of ‘funding gap’ has a focus on evidencing the
existence of credit constraints and the role of internal ﬁnance, its theoretical
inspiration and underpinnings come broadly from the theories of equilibrium
credit rationing, the central theme of which has been to rationalize quantity
rationing of credits as a rational behavior (see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), Allen (1983), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1987)). It has now
been established that when equilibrium quantity rationing occurs, the usual
price mechanism does not work to the eﬀect of equating demand and supply at
the equilibrium price. Instead, suppliers impose limits on the quantities directly,
which are short of the demand at the going market price, and are not to be
revised in case of higher bidding prices. This kind of equilibrium is possible in
the ﬁnancial market if the higher bidding price is associated with higher default
risk, hence, lower expected return. What remains open questions to economists
are: What do corporations do (contractually and or organizationally) to address
the problem of credit rationing? How does the market structure of the industry
where the ﬁrms belong to respond to the credit rationing mechanisms? And
how do the reactions at these two levels interact?
Although a comprehensive review of the theoretical credit rationing litera-
1This is independent of the argument that underinvestment in R&D occurs because of the
existence of externality.
2The most robust ﬁnding from this literature is that there exists an excessive sensitivity
of corporate investments to cash ﬂows. Numerous auxiliary evidence suggests that cash ﬂows
should be seen as a reasonable proxy of internal ﬁnance.
1ture is beyond the scope of the current paper, a few remarks would be helpful to
motivate our research. The existing theories of endogenous credit rationing have
been able to rationalize two types of credit rationing. The ﬁrst type, which we
call the ‘Type I credit rationing’, rations credit size, i.e., the amount of credit
extended is positive but below the level that maximizes the borrowing ﬁrm’s
proﬁt (Gale and Hellwig (1985)). The second type, which we refer to as the
‘Type II credit rationing’, denies credits to an unsuccessful fringe, i.e., only a
fraction of the applicants can obtain a positive amount of credit (Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981)). Gale and Hellwig (1985) considers a borrower-lender relation-
ship which is subject to asymmetric information and costly state veriﬁcation
(monitoring) by lenders. The optimal (second-best) ﬁnancial contract turns out
to be the standard debt contract. Credit rationing (under-investment) arises
in the optimal contract to the eﬀect of saving on the default risk and monitor-
ing cost. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) study a potential adverse selection problem
in the loan market. Randomized credit denial arises in equilibrium because the
lenders who are less informed about the project qualities understand that charg-
ing high interest rate would attract more high-risk borrowers at the expense of
driving away some low-risk borrowers, and result in higher expected default risk
and lower expected returns. At the going market rate, the demand exceeds the
supply of fund and a fraction of the loan applicants are denied credit entirely.
Since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) obtain the result of credit denial in a setting
where the size of each investment is exogenously ﬁxed, therefore it is not clear
whether the credit denial thereof is just a disguised credit size rationing.
A general intuition about equilibrium credit rationing is that the risk of
default on ﬁnancial contract becomes endogenous as a result of informational
asymmetry, moral hazard or other contracting problems3. Situations may occur
where higher price is associated with higher default risk and lower expected
return due to the various contracting problems, therefore in equilibrium the
aforementioned two types of credit rationing mechanisms arise to replace the
usual price mechanism in allocating capital among competing usages. As far as
ﬁnancial markets are concerned, quantity rationing becomes a fundamental part
of the market mechanism. The eﬀects of credit rationing on the real sectors of
economies have long been a focus of interest for economists.4 The most inter-
esting micro implications of credit rationing concern the relationship between
ﬁnancial market and industry structure. One question, which receives much at-
tention due to Bain (1956)’s controversial assertion that the disadvantage faced
by entrants vis-a-vis incumbents in access to capital market formed a barrier
to entry, is whether credit rationing contributes to market concentration. For
example the ‘long purse’ theory of predation (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)) suggests that the
endogenous credit rationing mechanism embedded in the relationship between a
3As will transpire in this article, the hold-up problem due to contract incompleteness is
another source of the contracting problems.
4Macro implications of credit rationing have been studied in the areas of monetary policy,
business cycle, and economic growth (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1992), Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Tong (2005b), Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004)).
2ﬁrm and its external investors makes it particularly vulnerable to predation from
its ‘deep-pocket’ rival(s), which jeopardizes its ability to invest and compete in
the future, and results in higher market concentration in equilibrium. It is not
clear, though, whether and how this example can be generalized.5 The impli-
cations of credit rationing on market structure are not only interesting from an
antitrust point of view, but also important for understanding the determinants
of industrial R&D, innovation and technological progress. Schumpeter (1942)
proposed that small ﬁrms were constrained in their ability to innovate because
they had diﬃculties in access to capital market, therefore large corporations
should be expected to play a major role in R&D and technological progress.
Despite the Schumpeterian hypothesis about the relationship between ﬁrm size
and innovation having inspired enormous research interest among economists
(see Cohen and Levin (1989) for a survey on the empirical literature of testing
the Schumpeterian Hypothesis), an integrated theory of equilibrium credit ra-
tioning, endogenous ﬁrm size distribution (market structure) and R&D is still
absent after sixty three years since Schumpeter’s seminal work.
This paper sets out to develop a theory of the ﬁrm and equilibrium credit ra-
tioning mechanisms in oligopoly, which features R&D-product market competi-
tion and endogenous industry structure. It blends two related literatures: one is
the literature on technology and market structure (Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980),
Sutton (1991), Sutton (1998)); the other is the literature of incomplete contract
theories of the ﬁrm and ﬁnancial contracting (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1988), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart and Moore (1994), Hart (1995),
Hart and Moore (1998), Aghion and Bolton (1992)). Departing from the black-
box view, we deﬁne a ﬁrm by its integrated business-corporate strategy. The
business strategy side deals with how the ﬁrm is going to compete with rival
ﬁrms, both in product market and in R&D. It determines the demand for long-
term investment (e.g., R&D). The corporate strategy side deals with how to
engage external investors in ﬁnancing the long-term investment which the busi-
ness strategy entails, and is beyond the reach of entrepreneurial own wealth.
Whereas the former literature provides us a natural basis to understand the
ﬁrms’ business strategies in free R&D-product market competition, the latter
helps us to gain insights on the ﬁrms’ corporate strategies. It has now been well
understood, that when long-term and technically complex investments (e.g.,
R&D projects6) are involved in a transaction, a complete (enforceable) ex ante
contract that governs every possible aspect of the transaction is hardly feasible
5Two questions arise here. First, what will happen if the ﬁrms that enter the market all
have the same depth (deep or shallow) of their pockets? Second, what fundamentally causes
the distinction between the deep pockets and shallow pockets among the ﬁrms that enter the
market?
6According to Hall (2002), “in practice 50 per cent or more of R&D spending is the wages
and salaries of highly educated scientists and engineers. Their eﬀorts create an intangible
asset, the ﬁrm’s knowledge base, from which proﬁts in future years will be generated. To the
extent that this knowledge is ‘tacit’ rather than codiﬁe d ,i ti se m b e d d e di nt h eh u m a nc a p i t a l
of the ﬁrm’s employees, and is therefore lost if they leave or are ﬁred.” Using the terminology
of Hart and Moore (1994), the outcome of R&D investments is, to a large extent, in the form
of inalienable human capital.
3or desirable7 (Williamson (1975), Williamson (1985), Hart and Moore (1999),
Hart and Moore (2004)); ex post negotiation (bargaining) is inevitable. The
incomplete contract theory of the ﬁrm literature has had an extensive investiga-
tion on the so call ‘hold-up’ problem, and drawn two general conclusions. First,
the ‘hold-up’ problem tends to result in under-investment. Second, the equilib-
rium organization forms (e.g., allocation of property rights) may be understood
as an optimal (the second-best) solution to mitigate the ‘hold-up’ problem.
Our research contributes to the incomplete contract theory of ﬁnancial con-
tracting, which is concerned with the equilibrium allocation of controls within a
ﬁrm that is founded by an entrepreneur who is wealth constrained (Aghion and
Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1998)). The existing models usually consider
ﬁxed size investment projects, hence, do not address the issue of credit-size ra-
tioning. We model an industry where R&D investment is a continuous variable
that increases a ﬁrm’s market share and ex post proﬁt, and there is a free entry
of entrepreneurs who can start up businesses in this market. The founding en-
trepreneur of each ﬁrm is wealth-constrained, and has to seek the participation
of external investors who themselves are not good at running the business. The
investments by the external investors are essential only because the entrepreneur
of the ﬁrm does not have suﬃcient internal funding. The outcome of an R&D
project, to a large extent8, resides in the entrepreneur’s human capital, which
can not be deprived by the external investors if the two parties terminate their
relationship. The potential hold-up of the external investors by the entrepre-
neur may constitute a de facto strategic ‘default’ on the ﬁnancial contract9.T h e
inability of the ‘ﬁrm’ to pledge the entirety of the marginal return of investment
to the external investors forces the external investors to ration the size of credit,
which results in under-investment in R&D if the entrepreneurial wealth con-
straint is already binding.10 To address the problem of underinvestment caused
by credit size rationing, the equilibrium corporate governance structure of the
ﬁrm, i.e., the allocation of controls (which determines the bargaining powers
of the two parties), assigns maximal feasible external investor protection in ex-
change for maximal feasible external capital participation. This ‘second best’
solution alleviates, but does not eliminate, the underinvestment problem.11
7The issue of incompleteness of contracts is particularly salient when the transactions
involve R&D, which is typically associated with complexity in technicality and a high degree
of uncertainty.
8The degree to which R&D fruition is tacitly embedded in the entrepreneur’s human capital
is an endogenous variable, depending on the ﬁrm’s governance of the intellectual properties,
but bounded from above by some exogenous limit.
9If the ﬁnancial contract takes the form of debt contract, then the hold-up literally consti-
tutes a default on the debt service obligation. In case of equity ﬁnancing, the hold-up may not
literally constitute a default on a formal ﬁnancial contract, but it is a default on an implicit
contract.
10If the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is not binding, the investment deﬁcit can be made
up by entrepreneurial own wealth.
11If the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is not binding, the ‘ﬁrst best’ result can be
achieved in this model by a continuum of corporate governance structure and the associ-
ated level of external capital participation. In a sense, ﬁnancial structure doesn’t matter
hereby, which echoes the familiar Modigliani-Miller (irrelevance) theorem.
4In the equilibrium of our model, all ﬁrms’ business-corporate strategies are
jointly determined, which also determine the market structure. Therefore the
equilibrium credit rationing mechanisms interact with the industry structure.
One possible outcome of the interaction is a credit rationing mechanism that has
a simple and equitable credit-size rationing rule. So that all ﬁrms are rationed
and underinvest in a symmetric way, and free entry leads to a larger number
of smaller ﬁrms who just break even. In this type of symmetric equilibrium
outcome, competition in R&D is milder and competition in product market is
more intense, which hamper the overall investments in R&D. This is the kind of
equilibrium outcome that Schumpeter (1942) criticized heavily. There is another
type of equilibrium outcome where the credit rationing mechanism comprises
two sets of rules. One relates to credit denial to a certain fraction of ﬁrms,
the other relates to credit-size rationing the ﬁrms who are not denied credits.
It turns out that when there is credit denial, the credit-size rationing rule is
more favorable than the one adopted in a symmetric equilibrium outcome. In
this kind of asymmetric equilibrium outcome, free entry gives rise to a skew
ﬁrm size distribution and a divide between winners (‘predators’) and losers
(‘preys’). The winners - the endogenous ‘deep pocket’ ﬁrms ‘predate’ upon the
losers - the ‘shallow pocket’ ﬁrms whose vulnerable relationships with external
investors break down as a result of the ‘predation’12.13 Our theory shows that
credit denial and the associated ‘predatory’ outcome arise as a ‘market solution’
to the contractual problems that cause credit rationing in the ﬁrst place. In
the context of large R&D-intensive industries, this market solution entails a
selective allocation of credits and a competition for credits among a pool of
excess entrepreneurial entrants. The external investors play an important role
in selecting the winners. Although the selection process involves ‘predation’
among the ﬁrms, causing skewness in ﬁrm size distribution and raising market
concentration, it nevertheless has an eﬃciency defence in terms of motivating
more investments in R&D.14
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 con-
structs the model. Section 3 characterizes the symmetric equilibrium outcomes,
particularly, those with binding credit constraints. In Section 4, we characterize
asymmetric equilibrium outcomes where both types of credit rationing (credit
size rationing and credit denial) coexist. Section 5 concludes.
12The ‘deep-pocket’ ﬁrms’ behavior is ‘predatory’ in the sense that if the collapse of the
‘shallow-pocket’ ﬁrms’ corporate strategy is not at stake, the former’s integrated business-
corporate strategies would have been much less aggressive.
13In a companion paper, Tong (2005a), develops a two-period model of predatory pricing,
where the distinction between ‘deep pocket’ and ‘shallow pocket’ ﬁrms is entirely endogenous.
The ﬁrms in the model can beneﬁt from a learning eﬀect in the second period if they produce in
large quantities in the ﬁrst period. The opportunity cost incurred in the form of forgone ﬁrst-
period proﬁtc o n s t i t u t e sa nﬁxed investment cost. In the asymmetric equilibrium outcome, it
is possible that in the ﬁrst period the deep-pocket ﬁrms push the price to a predatory low level
which jeopardizes the shallow-pocket ﬁrms’ ability to learn in the ﬁrst period and to survive
in the second period.
14So this is the kind the equilibrium outcome one might be concerned with in light of Bain
(1956), but would rather endorse following Schumpeter (1942) and in the new light of the
current investigation.
52 The Model
We begin by describing the spot market where the industry sells its product.
There are a number S of identical consumers in this market of a vertically
diﬀerentiable product. Hence parameter S measures the size of the market.
Each consumer’s preference is given by the following quasi-linear utility function:
U =
N X
i=1
(uiqi) −
1
2
N X
i=1
N X
j=1
qiqj + m (1)
s.t. :
N X
i=1
piqi + m ≤ I
where N is the number of active ﬁrms that oﬀer (a positive quantity of) the
vertically diﬀerentiable product; ui and qi are the quality and quantity supplied
by ﬁrm i; m is the numeraire; I is the income.
The ﬁrst order necessary condition of the above maximization program im-
plies the following individual inverse demand function: pi = ui−
PN
j=1 qj. Each
ﬁrm has a constant marginal cost ci (for ﬁrm i). When the number of ﬁrms
and their respective levels of quality and marginal costs are ﬁxed, the ﬁrms
compete in the manner a la Cournot15. Hence, each ﬁrm’s objective is given by
the following maximization program:
maxΠi = S

ui −
N X
j=1
qj − ci

qi. (2)
The equilibrium output and price-cost margin at individual ﬁrm level are
qi = pi − ci =m a x

0,κi −
1
(N +1 )
N X
j=1
κj

 (3)
for all i =1 ,2,···,N,where κi , ui−ci is ﬁrm i’s level of ‘capability’. So a ﬁrm
can have a high capability by possessing a high quality or a low marginal cost.
In equilibrium, qi ≥ 0 and pi − ci ≥ 0 are satisﬁed. The implied equilibrium
proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm is given by
Πi (κi;κ−i)=Sπi (κi;κ−i)=
S
(N +1 )
2

κi +
N X
j=1
(κi − κj)


2
, (4)
conditional on all ﬁrms: i =1 ,2,···,N remain active; where κ−i =( κj)N−1 for
j 6= i is the vector of all rivals’ levels of capability; πi (κi;κ−i) is the normalized
15The main results of the paper does not rely on this speciﬁc assumption of ﬁrm conduct,
e.g., a Bertrand competition with horizontal diﬀerentiation would not change them.
6proﬁt function (for unit market size). Most of the properties of Πi (κi;κ−i) are
the properties of πi (κi;κ−i), which will be characterized in what follows.
To start with, πi (κi;κ−i) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable conditional on
the composition of the set of active ﬁrms remains unchanged16, non-decreasing
in own capability, and non-increasing in any rival’s capability, i.e., ∂πi
∂κi ≥ 0, ∂πi
∂κj ≤
0. In general the elasticity of πi with respect to κi is
∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
=
2N
1+
PN
j=1
³
1 −
κj
κi
´. (5)
It happens that when valued at a symmetric conﬁguration, the elasticity is
independent of the level of capability, but increases with the number of ﬁrms,
more precisely,
∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(κi;κ−i)=(κ;(κ)N−1)
=2 N>0, (6)
which means that the more fragmented the symmetric market structure, the
higher the proportional marginal beneﬁt of investing in capability. The property
is driven by the ‘business stealing’ eﬀect of increasing capability. Also a ﬁrm’s
proportional marginal beneﬁt of increasing capability is non-increasing in its
level of capability in an oligopoly, i.e.,
∂
³
∂πi
∂κi
κi
π
´
∂κi
< 0 for N ≥ 2 and πi > 0. (7)
Having characterized a ﬁrm’s (proportional) marginal beneﬁto fi n v e s t i n g
in capability, now we look at the proportional marginal cost of investing in
capability by considering the following simple increasing and convex ﬁxed cost
function:
F (κ)=κβ, (β > 2), (8)
which has a constant elasticity17 or proportional marginal cost, i.e.,
∂F
∂κ
κ
F
= β. (9)
In what follows we study how the levels of capability are determined in
equilibrium when there are free entry and conﬂict of interest between the entre-
preneurs and the external investors of the ﬁrms. The conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s to r i g i n s
from the lack of commitment power by the entrepreneurs (corporate insiders)
to pledge the entirety of proﬁt to external investors. For simplicity, we model
16In case of any change in the composition of the set of active ﬁrms, additional active ﬁrms
must be included in the expression, and inactive ﬁrms must be excluded from it. As a result,
such a change may produce a ‘kink’ (i.e., continuous but non-diﬀerentiable point) in the proﬁt
function.
17As illustrated in Sutton (1998), what really matters is that the elasticity of the ﬁxed cost
function is bounded from above by a constant β < ∞. Assuming a constant elasticity makes
the analysis much more tractable.
7it as an ex post bargaining over the split of the proﬁt: none of the two parities
has an (ex post) outside option and the external investors entrepreneur’s bar-
gaining power is si ∈ [0,θ] where θ ∈ (0,1). Then the pledgeable income18 for
the external investors is siΠi (κi;κ−i), and the entrepreneur takes the remain-
ing (1 − si)Πi (κi;κ−i).V a r i a b l esi is an endogenous variable that summarizes
all the information about the corporate governance structure, including the al-
location of property rights (hence, formal authority), delegation (hence, real
authority) and decision procedure (hence, bargaining). As will transpire in the
equilibrium analysis of the model, si will be optimally chosen to address the
ﬁrm’s demand for external investment and external investors’ concern about
the return of their investments.
The following three-stage game describes the environment where ﬁrms are
incorporated, ﬁnanced and run, and the industry structure is determined.
Stage 1: A (suﬃciently large) number of potential entrepreneurs simultaneously
decide whether to enter the market.
Stage 2: Upon entry, entrepreneurs simultaneously announce their target capabil-
ity levels, and each proposes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the external in-
vestors in the competitive capital market. So each entrepreneur’s (in-
tegrated business-corporate) strategy is a vector (κi,˜ θi,s i),w h e r eκi is
the capability level which summarizes the ﬁrm’s business strategy, ˜ θi is
the external investors’ share of capital cost, which summarizes the ﬁrm’s
source of R&D ﬁnance, and si ∈ [0,θ] is the bargaining power assigned to
the external investors by the endogenous corporate governance structure,
which has an exogenous upper bound θ ∈ (0,1). Each entrepreneur has
to build the ability to commit to the corporate governance structure si,
which requires the commitment of the insider equity19:
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi) at
t h et i m eo ft h eo ﬀering, which is funded from the entrepreneurial wealth
ω.
• If the oﬀer is accepted with the requested external investments, then
it is implemented, namely, the corporate governance structure is rat-
iﬁed, the funds are collected from the external investors, the target
capability is developed, and the investments are sunk.
18The term ‘pledgeable income’ is coined by Tirole (2001).
19The justiﬁcation of this assumption is the following argument. The entrepreneur’s com-
mitment to the proposed corporate governance structure is investment outcome-speciﬁc. For
example, the allocation of the control of certain intellectual property rights can only be
arranged after the intellectual property rights have been created or deﬁn e da sa no u t c o m e
of the investment. Therefore the ability to commit to the proposed corporate governance
structure depends on the extent to which the investment has been committed. Failure to
commit the promised insider equity is a jeopardy to the ability to commit to the proposed
corporate governance structure. For the sake of argument, suppose that a failure to commit
insider equity is equivalent to choosing si =0 , which surely makes the contract unacceptable.
Then, committing the proposed insider equity is a necessary condition for the contract to be
accepted.
8• If the oﬀer is not accepted with the requested external investments,
it is void; and the de facto investment level is
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi),w i t h
no external investors involved.
Stage 3: After the investments are sunk, the entrepreneurs and external investors
bargain over the sharing of ex post proﬁts,20 Πi (κi;κ−i).
• The bargaining outcomes are determined by the Nash bargaining
solution with external investors’ bargaining power being si.
• The proﬁt of a solely internally ﬁnanced ﬁrm is accrued entirely to
the entrepreneur.
We characterize the equilibrium of the game by backward induction. The
equilibrium of the third stage subgame is self evident from the above description
of the game. So we start with the second stage. Here we have to distinguish
two types of equilibria. The ﬁrst type does not involve any credit denial, i.e.,
the number of entrepreneurs and the oﬀers they make are such that all the
contracts are accepted. The second type of equilibrium sees some entrepreneurs
are denied external credit hence relying on internal ﬁnance entirely. In this and
the next section we focus on the ﬁrst type of equilibrium. The second type is
dealt with in Section 4.
At stage 2, conditional on the contract is accepted with certainty, each en-
trepreneur’s program is to choose the integrated business-corporate-strategy ³
κi,˜ θi,s i
´
to maximize the entrepreneurial surplus, i.e.,
max
(κi,˜ θi,si)
(1 − si)Sπi (κi;κ−i) −
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi) (10)
subject to:
siSπi (κi;κ−i) − ˜ θiF (κi) ≥ 0, (11)
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi) ≤ ω, (12)
si ≤ θ (13)
where the ﬁrst constraint (11) is the external investors’ participation constraint,
which says the external investor surplus can not be negative; the second, (12),
is the entrepreneurial wealth constraint; the third, is the corporate governance
constraint, which says the maximal external investor protection is bounded from
above by the exogenous limit θ.
20This is to implicitly assume that the sharing of proﬁtc a nn o tb ec o n t r a c t e de xa n t e ,o r
the contracts will have to be renegotiated ex post. It is an assumption of incompleteness of
contacts. Alternatively, we can assume that the sharing of proﬁt is speciﬁed in the contract,
but impose that only renegotiation-proof contracts are accepted in equilibrium.
9The Lagrangian function of the program is
L =
³
(1 − si)Sπi (κi;κ−i) −
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi)
´
−λi
³
˜ θiF (κi) − siSπi (κi;κ−i)
´
− νi
³³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi) − ω
´
− ηi (si − θ)
where λi ≥ 0, νi ≥ 0 and ηi ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers, which are
the ‘shadow price’ of one unit reduction of the external investor surplus, the
marginal entrepreneurial surplus of the entrepreneurial wealth, and the ‘shadow
price’ of one unit increase of the upper limit of the external investor bargaining
power.
The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for the solution of the program are:
∂L
∂κi
=( 1− si)S
∂πi
∂κi
−
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F0 (κi)−λi
µ
˜ θiF0 (κi) − siS
∂πi
∂κi
¶
−νi
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F0 (κi)=0
(14)
∂L
∂˜ θi
= F (κi) − λiF (κi)+νiF (κi)=0 (15)
∂L
∂si
= −Sπi (κi;κ−i)+λiSπi (κi;κ−i) − ηi =0 (16)
½
siSπi (κi;κ−i)=˜ θiF (κi) if λi > 0
siSπi (κi;κ−i) > ˜ θiF (κi) if λi =0
(17)



ω −
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi)=0if νi > 0
ω −
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi) > 0 if νi =0
(18)
½
θ − si =0if ηi > 0
θ − si > 0 if ηi =0 (19)
Eq. (15) gives rise to
λi = νi +1 , (20)
which is used to simplify (14) and (16), yielding
νi =
S ∂πi
∂κi − F0 (κi)
F0 (κi) − siS ∂πi
∂κi
, (21)
λi =
(1 − si)S ∂πi
∂κi
F0 (κi) − siS ∂πi
∂κi
, (22)
and
ηi = νiSπi (κi;κ−i)=
S ∂πi
∂κi − F0 (κi)
F0 (κi) − siS ∂πi
∂κi
Sπi (κi;κ−i). (23)
Since si ≤ θ < 1 it follows form (21) that νi ≥ 0 if and only if
siS
∂πi
∂κi
≤ F0 (κi) ≤ S
∂πi
∂κi
, (24)
10which rules out the possibility of ∂πi
∂κi =0for κi > 0. And then (22) entails that
λi 6=0 . As a result, (17) implies:
Lemma 1 One necessary condition for the solution to program (10) is that the
external investors’ participation constraint (11) must be binding, i.e., λi > 0
and
siSπi (κi;κ−i)=˜ θiF (κi). (25)
The above lemma says that in equilibrium the external investor surplus is
exactly zero. This result is not surprising given that there is perfect competition
in the capital market and extracting more external investor surplus makes the
entrepreneur better oﬀ.
Depending on the range of parameters, one (and only one) of the following
two possible cases occurs in equilibrium.
Case 1: The entrepreneurial wealth constraint (12) is not binding, hence νi =
0, λi =1 , ηi =0 ,a n d
S
∂πi
∂κi
= F0 (κi). (26)
i.e., the ﬁrm as a whole maximizes its net proﬁt; there is neither “under-
investment” nor “over-investment” from the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing point
of view. In this case, the corporate governance constraint is not binding
either, i.e., the entrepreneur sees no need to provide maximal feasible
protection to external investors.
Case 2: The entrepreneurial wealth constraint (12) is binding, hence νi > 0,
and ³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κi)=ω. (27)
Consequently, condition (23) implies ηi > 0 and
si = θ. (28)
From (25), (27) and (28), it follows that
θSπi (κi;κ−i) − F (κi)+ω =0 . (29)
The left-hand side of the above equation is the external investor surplus
function conditional on binding entrepreneurial wealth constraint. To em-
phasize its importance, we denote it by Zi (κi;κ−i), hence,
Zi (κi;κ−i) , θSπi (κi;κ−i) − F (κi)+ω. (30)
Then condition (29) can be reformulated as the following zero external
investor surplus condition:
Zi (κi;κ−i)=0 . (31)
Since the solution to this equation is not necessarily unique, the following
lemma speciﬁes which one of them should be selected in equilibrium.
11Lemma 2 When the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is binding, the global
maximum of program (10) corresponds to the maximal solution to eq. (31).
Proof. Suppose the equilibrium selects a sub-maximal solution to condition
(31), say κ∗
i,a n dt h e r ee x i s t s˜ κi > κ∗
i which is the maximal solution to condition
(31). Given that the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is binding, increasing κi
from κ∗
i to ˜ κi which is solely ﬁnanced by the external investors is a Pareto
improvement, i.e., it is acceptable to the external investors, and makes the
entrepreneur better oﬀ. This constitutes a feasible and proﬁtable deviation for
the entrepreneur, which contradicts the assumption that κ∗
i is an equilibrium
solution.
The following proposition states the role of entrepreneurial wealth in aﬀect-
ing the behavior of the ﬁrm.
Proposition 3 If the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is not binding, the cor-
porate governance constraint is not binding either and equilibrium level of in-
vestment maximizes the ﬁrm’s net proﬁt, i.e., condition (26) is satisﬁed. If the
entrepreneurial wealth constraint is binding, then there is an under-investment
in capability from a ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing point of view, i.e.,
S
∂πi
∂κi
>F 0 (κi). (32)
To address this problem optimally, the equilibrium corporate governance struc-
ture oﬀers maximal feasible external investor protection, i.e., si = θ.
Proof. When νi > 0, condition (21) implies condition (32).
The hold-up problem generates a potential conﬂict of interest between two
groups of stakeholders of a ﬁrm, i.e., the entrepreneur and the external investors.
The above proposition says that when the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is
not binding, the two parties can have an eﬃcient (ex ante) bargaining, and
achieve the ‘ﬁrst best’ result from the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximizing point of view.
This is possible because in our model the entrepreneurial wealth and external
investment are perfect substitutes. The eﬃcient ex ante bargaining resolves
around choosing the ‘ﬁrst best’ level of total investment, dividing the total in-
vestment cost between the two parties, and allocating the ex post bargaining
powers such that external investors get exactly zero surplus at this level. This
maximizes the ﬁrm’s net proﬁt as well as the entrepreneurial surplus condi-
tional on the external investors breaking even. In this case, obviously, the way
to divide the total investment cost and allocating ex post bargaining powers to
achieve the eﬃcient (ex ante) bargaining outcome is not unique. In a sense,
the sources of ﬁn a n c ea n dt h es t r u c t u r eo fc o r p o r a t eg o v e r n a n c eb e c o m ei r r e l -
evant to the outcome. This result is reminiscent to the famous Modigliani and
Miller (1958) theorem on the irrelevance of capital structure to corporate invest-
ment decisions. The result is reversed if the entrepreneurial wealth constraint
is binding, where the two parties can not achieve eﬃcient (ex ante) bargain-
ing. Consequently, the ﬁrm, as a whole, underinvests in R&D. In an attempt
12to alleviate the underinvestment problem, the equilibrium corporate governance
structure must oﬀer the external investors the maximal (feasible) protection in
order to encourage their capital contribution. Since the external investor par-
ticipation constraint is always binding, if the entrepreneurial wealth constraint
is also binding, it must be the case that ﬁrm’s investment level is suboptimal.
In the rest of paper we simply refer this (respectively, the opposite) situation as
“with (respectively, without) binding credit constraints”.
3 Equilibrium Outcome with Equal Firm Size
Distribution
In what follows we characterize the equilibrium of the whole game. This allows
us to see how the endogenous credit rationing mechanism interacts with the
industry structure. To simplify the analysis at this stage, we delay the charac-
terization of any asymmetric equilibrium outcomes to Section 4. In this section
we characterize the equilibrium outcome with equal ﬁrm size distribution, i.e.,
κi = κ∗ for all i =1 ,2,···,N∗,w h e r eN∗ is the number of ﬁrms in equilibrium.
Given our interest in the eﬀect of competition, we only consider environments
which warrant N∗ ≥ 2.
In a symmetric equilibrium outcome with free entry, the following entrepre-
neurial break-even condition arises:
(1 − si)Sπ(κ∗,N∗)=
³
1 − ˜ θi
´
F (κ∗). (33)
Now the external investors’ participation constraint takes a simpler form:
siSπ(κ∗,N∗)=˜ θiF (κ∗). (34)
The above two conditions yield the following ﬁrm’s break-even condition:
Sπ(κ∗,N∗)=F (κ∗) (35)
and the condition
˜ θi = si (36)
Proposition 4 In a symmetric equilibrium outcome with free entry and ex-
ternal investments, the external investors’ capital share equals to the external
investors’ ex post bargaining power, i.e., ˜ θi = si,a n de a c hﬁrm breaks even.
The above proposition says given the competition conditions of the R&D-
product market and the corporate governance structure of each ﬁrm, the exter-
nal investors choose the credit rationing mechanism precisely according to the
protection they obtain from the corporate governance structure. A balanced
composition of internal equity and external ﬁnance in relation to the corporate
governance structure is required if external ﬁnance occurs.
133.1 Without binding credit constraints
The results presented in this subsection are useful benchmarks since they shed
light on what would happen if there were no imperfection in the capital market.
When the entrepreneurial wealth constraint (12) is not binding, conditions (26)
and (35) both hold and jointly imply that
∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(κnb,Nnb)
=2 Nnb = β, (37)
i.e.,
Nnb =
β
2
(38)
where Nnb and κnb are the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and capability level
in this case, and subscript nb indicates that the wealth constraint (12) is not
binding. Notice that the number of ﬁrms (hence market structure) does not
depend on the size of the market S. This is because if the market is large, the
ﬁrms simply escalate their investments in capability, and the burden of the ﬁxed
cost prevents the number of ﬁrms from increasing. This can be shown by the
following equilibrium level of capability:
κnb =



S
³
β
2 +1
´2



1
β−2
. (39)
Clearly, κnb increases with S. Also interestingly, κnb does not depend on the
entrepreneurial wealth level. We know in this situation, the interests of the
entrepreneur and external investors are aligned and the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt,
just as if the ﬁrm is solely ﬁnanced by the entrepreneurial wealth and there is no
conﬂict of interest. In this case, there is an indiﬀerence in the ﬁnancial structure
of a ﬁrm. An entrepreneur can assign a larger (smaller) share of capital cost to
the external investors and at the same time oﬀer them a higher (lower) degree of
protection as long as the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is not binding, i.e.,
ω ≥ (1 − si)



S
³
β
2 +1
´2



β
β−2
(40)
Proposition 5 The symmetric market conﬁguration (κnb,N nb) occurs in an
equilibrium if and only the entrepreneurial wealth level is suﬃciently high, i.e.,
ω ≥ (1 − θ)
µ
S
(
β
2 +1)
2
¶ β
β−2
, or equivalently the market size is not too large, i.e.,
S ≤ S
¯
(θ,ω) ,
µ
β
2
+1
¶2 µ
ω
1 − θ
¶ β−2
β
. (41)
14And κnb increases with market size S, i.e., ∂κnb
∂S > 0, is independent of S, i.e.,
∂Nnb
∂S =0 .
Proof. First we show that given there are (Nnb − 1) other ﬁrms of capability
κnb, the integrated business-corporate strategy
³
κnb,˜ θi,s i
´
which satisﬁes con-
dition (25) is a global maximum for entrepreneur i’s the maximization program
(10) if the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is not binding. Note that if the
entrepreneurial wealth constraint is not binding, then the corporate governance
constraint is not binding either; and we can substitute the binding external in-
vestors’ participation constraint (25) into the objective function of program (10)
to eliminate variable ˜ θi and si and get the following simpliﬁed the maximization
program:
max
κi
Sπi (κi;κ−i) − F (κi) (42)
i.e., to choose κi to maximize the ﬁrm’s net proﬁt. We need to show the
κnb is a global maximum of Sπi
¡
κi;(κnb)Nnb−1
¢
− F (κi). It is known that
Sπ(κnb,N nb)=F (κnb) and ∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
¯ ¯ ¯
(κnb,Nnb)
=
dF(κi)
dκi
κi
F(κi)
¯ ¯ ¯
(κnb)
= β. These
and property (7), i.e., ∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi is decreasing in κi conditional on πi > 0,j o i n t l y
imply that
Sπi
¡
κi;(κnb)Nnb−1
¢
<F (κi) for κi > κnb,
Sπi
¡
κi;(κnb)Nnb−1
¢
<F (κi) for κi < κnb and πi > 0,
i.e., κnb is the maximum for the range whereof πi > 0. For the range whereof
πi =0 , the maximum is κi =0 . Overall, κi =0and κnb are the two global
maximal points. Given the symmetry of the outcome, no ﬁrm should want to
unilaterally deviate from the market conﬁguration (κnb,N nb) if the entrepre-
neurial wealth constraints are not binding. Next we show that condition (40)
can be satisﬁed if condition (41) is satisﬁe d ;i ti st r u ef o rt h ee x a m p l esi = θ.
Conversely, if condition (40) is violated, supposing the entrepreneurial wealth
constraint is not binding would cause a contradiction.
Finally, the comparative statics follow immediately from (38) and (39).
3.2 With binding credit constraints
The entrepreneurial wealth constraint is binding if
ω < (1 − θ)



S
³
β
2 +1
´2



β
β−2
, (43)
or
S>S
¯
(θ,ω), (44)
15w h i c hw ea s s u m ea r es a t i s ﬁed for the analysis of this subsection. As a result,
(28) and (36) imply that
˜ θi = si = θ. (45)
Here the equilibrium credit rationing mechanism has a simple credit-size ra-
tioning rule. It is based on the expectation that each ﬁrm just breaks even.
This is due to the free entry, which erodes any possible positive (or negative)
net proﬁts in a symmetric equilibrium outcome. To ensure that the external in-
vestors break even, their share of the capital cost must equal to their expected
share of proﬁt. And then (27) and (36) imply
S (κb)
2
(Nb +1 )
2 =( κb)
β =
ω
1 − θ
, (46)
where Nb and κb are the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and capability level in
this case; and subscript b indicates that the entrepreneurial wealth constraint is
binding. Consequently,
κb =
µ
ω
1 − θ
¶1/β
(47)
and
Nb =
Ã
S
µ
1 − θ
ω
¶1−2/β!1/2
− 1 (48)
Proposition 6 In the symmetric equilibrium outcome with binding credit con-
straints, the credit rationing rule is given by ˜ θi = θ, and the level of each ﬁrm’s
capability is increasing in the entrepreneurial wealth level, i.e., ∂κb
∂ω > 0;i s
increasing in the upper limit of the external investors’ bargaining power, i.e.,
∂κb
∂θ > 0; does not change with the size of the market, i.e., ∂κb
∂S =0 .T h en u m b e r
of ﬁrms, Nb, is decreasing in the entrepreneurial wealth level, i.e., ∂Nb
∂ω < 0;i s
decreasing in the upper limit of the external investors’ bargaining power, i.e.,
∂Nb
∂θ < 0; is increasing in the size of the market, i.e., ∂Nb
∂S > 0.
The symmetric equilibrium outcome without binding credit constraints can
be used as a benchmark to measure the impacts of binding wealth constraints
on the equilibrium market structure and capability level.
Proposition 7 Compared with the symmetric equilibrium outcome without bind-
ing credit constraints, the symmetric equilibrium outcome with binding credit
constraints has a lower level of capability and a larger number active ﬁrms in
the market, i.e., κb ≤ κnb and Nb ≥ Nnb.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6 that ∂κb
∂ω > 0, ∂Nb
∂ω < 0.I t i s a l s o a
fact that κnb and Nnb are independent of ω,a n dκnb = κb, Nnb = Nb when
ω =( 1− θ)
³
S/(β/2+1 )
2´β/(β−2)
.A s a r e s u l t , κb ≤ κnb and Nb ≥ Nnb as
ω ≤ (1 − θ)
³
S/(β/2+1 )
2
´β/(β−2)
.
16The above comparison reveals the consequences of credit size rationing (Type
I credit rationing) in the symmetric equilibrium outcome with binding entrepre-
neurial wealth constraints,p a r t i c u l a r l ya b o u th o wi ta ﬀects the level of capabil-
ity and the market structure. Compared with the benchmark case, clearly there
is an under-investment in capability at each individual ﬁrm level. Proposition
6i d e n t i ﬁes the determinants and the consequences of the credit size rationing
in the oligopoly market. The level of the entrepreneurial wealth and the upper
limit of feasible external investor protection are the key determinants. More en-
trepreneurial wealth and higher external investor protection potential are shown
to reduce the severity of the credit size rationing and under-investment in capa-
bility. The size of the market aﬀects the relative (as opposed to the benchmark
level), rather than the absolute, level of investment in capability. The conse-
quences of the credit size rationing are an under-investment in R&D at the ﬁrm
and industry levels (see the proposition below), and a rise in the number of
active ﬁrms.
Proposition 8 Compared with the symmetric equilibrium outcome without bind-
ing credit constraints, industry level of R&D expenditure in the symmetric equi-
librium outcome with binding credit constraints is lower, it is increasing in the
level of entrepreneurial wealth ω and the upper bound of the external investor
protection θ.
Proof. The industry level of R&D expenditure under symmetric binding
credit constraints is given by Nb (κb)
β . The level without binding credit con-
straints is given by Nnb (κnb)
β . I ti sk n o w nb o t h( κb,N b)a n d( κnb,N nb)a r e
solutions to eq. (35), more precisely, the following equation:
Sκ2
(N +1 )
2 =( κ)
β ,
which implies that the industry level of R&D expenditure is now given by
N (κ)
β = N
Ã
S
(N +1 )
2
! β
β−2
.
Diﬀerentiating the logarithm of both sides of the above equation w.r.t. N reveals
that
dln
³
N (κ)
β
´
dN
= −
βN − β +2 N +2
N (β − 2)(N +1 )
< 0 since N>1 and β > 2.
Given that Nb >N nb, it follows that Nb (κb)
β <N nb (κnb)
β. Similarly, since
Nnb is decreasing in ω and θ, it follows that Nb (κb)
β should be increasing in ω
and θ.
The result of under-investment in R&D at the industry level due to bind-
ing credit constraints has important implications for technological progress and
17economic growth. In a cross-section of countries, ceteris paribus, countries with
higher values of θ have better long-term growth performance.21 This result
holds despite the fact that the under-investment at the individual ﬁrm level is
associated with a larger number of active ﬁrms in the market. The ﬁnding that
more entry of ﬁrms can not compensate the reduction of R&D investment at
each individual ﬁrm level is consistent with Schumpeter (1942)’s assertion that
small ﬁrms in near-perfectly competitive product market could contribute little
to R&D and innovations.
One property of the symmetric equilibrium outcome with binding credit
constraints revealed in Proposition 6 is that the number of ﬁrms increases with in
the size of the market. This property resembles the relationship between market
size and market structure in industries where the sunk (ﬁxed) cost is exogenous.
The diﬀerence between them though, is that while the lower bound of k-ﬁrm
concentration measure approaches zero as the market size approaches inﬁnity in
the ‘exogenous sunk cost’ industries (Sutton (1991)), this ‘convergence’ result
does not hold in the kind of markets modeled here. The reason for the diﬀerence
is that as the size of market is suﬃciently large, the symmetric outcome with
binding credit constraints ceases to be equilibrium. To see why this is the case,
in what follows we turn to a necessary condition for the symmetric market
conﬁguration (κb,N b) to occur in an equilibrium.
A necessary condition for any equilibrium is condition (24), which in combi-
nation with eq. (35) and (45) implies a necessary condition for (κb,N b) to occur
in an equilibrium as follows:
θ
∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(κb,Nb)
≤
F0 (κi)κi
F (κi)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(κb,Nb)
. (49)
Recall eq. (6) and (9) that ∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
¯ ¯ ¯
(κb,Nb)
=2 Nb and
F
0(κi)κi
F(κi) = β.T h ea b o v e
condition implies
Nb ≤
β
2θ
, (50)
which also sets an upper bound to S given the fact that Nb increases in S.
Deﬁne a threshold value of S, ¯ S (θ,ω),s u c ht h a t ,
¯ S (θ,ω) ,
µ
ω
1 − θ
¶1−2/β µ
β
2θ
+1
¶2
, (51)
so when S = ¯ S (θ,ω),
Nb =
β
2θ
. (52)
Lemma 9 A symmetric equilibrium outcome with binding credit constraints ex-
ists only if
S ≤ ¯ S (θ,ω). (53)
21See Tong (2005b) for a formal discussion.
18The intuition is that when the size of the market is suﬃciently large, the
number of ﬁrms Nb would be so large that each ﬁrm’s (local) proportional
marginal beneﬁt of increasing capability at (κb,N b) would be so high, that
the proportional marginal beneﬁt to the external investors would exceed their
proportional marginal cost of increasing capability. There would be a proﬁtable
deviation for each entrepreneur. Hence no symmetric equilibrium outcome with
binding credit constraints can exist.
4 Asymmetric Equilibrium Outcome
In this section, we characterize asymmetric equilibrium outcomes where the
ﬁrm size distribution is uneven. We are interested in this kind of equilibrium
outcomes not only because a symmetric equilibrium outcome does not always
exist, but also because, as will transpire shortly, they have important economic
and policy implications.
For tractability we consider the simplest asymmetric equilibrium outcome
with symmetric integrated business-corporate strategies. The outcome is asym-
metric because a strictly positive fraction of the start-up ﬁrms end up with being
denied external credits completely in equilibrium. The only element of asym-
metry that occurs is between the start-up ﬁrms who are successful in securing
external investments and those who fail to do so. There is symmetry between
those who succeed, and similarly between those who are not successful. From
an ex ante point of view, the entrepreneurs who choose to enter the market in
the ﬁrst stage all seem identical. When they plan to propose the same oﬀer to
external investors at the second stage, for whatever ex ante expected selection
strategy adopted by the external investors, they correctly expect each of them
has an equal chance of being a winner.
In what follows we tell a more elaborate version of the story, which ﬁts the
above description well, and is a suﬃcient but not necessary story. Suppose
among potential entrants of the market, there are two types of entrepreneurs:
a good type, who are capable of adopting the best practice of corporate gover-
nance hence is bounded from above by the upper limit θ > 0;ab a dt y p e ,w h o
are not capable of adopting the best practice of corporate governance, hence is
bounded from above by a strictly smaller upper limit ρθ (0 ≤ ρ < 1). Only a
good entrepreneur is able to provide a signal (proof) of the upper limit being
θ within a ﬁnite time interval (at stage 2). The speed of a good entrepreneur
producing the signal (proof) is an independent random draw from an identical
uniform distribution; a bad entrepreneur can never produce the signal. In equi-
librium, entrepreneurs self-select: only the good entrepreneurs enter the market.
External investors adopt the following selection strategy: ﬁrst, request all en-
trepreneurial entrants to simultaneously race into proving proofs of their upper
limits being θ; second, exclude all the entrepreneurs who fail to provide any
p r o o fi nt i m e ,a n dr a n kt h er e m a i n i n ge n t repreneurs primarily by the expected
levels of external investor surplus they oﬀer, in case of a tie, break the tie by
their race scores; third, accept and only accept the oﬀers of the top-ranking
19Nh entrepreneurs (where Nh is the equilibrium number of successful ﬁrms to
be deﬁned in the next paragraph). This outcome is an equilibrium because no
player wants to unilaterally deviate from it. In this version of the story, such an
equilibrium outcome constitutes an ‘eﬃciency’-based selection process, which
deters bad entrepreneurs from entry and gives entrepreneurs (who enter and
hence are good) equal opportunities to win the competition for external credits.
Suppose in equilibrium there are N entrepreneurs that enter at stage 1,a l l
propose the same integrated business-corporate strategy
³
κh,˜ θ,s h
´
in stage 2.
Only a fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of the oﬀers are accepted by external investors in equi-
librium, giving rise to Nh = φN successful, hence, high-capability ﬁrms with
the implemented strategy
³
κh,˜ θ,s h
´
. The other oﬀers are rejected in equilib-
rium, giving rise to Nl =( 1− φ) unsuccessful low-capability ﬁrms whose actual
business-corporate status are (κl,0,0), i.e., with no external ﬁnance. Each en-
trepreneur who enters in equilibrium has an ex ante equal chance of winning
the selection with probability φ since their oﬀers are identical in equilibrium.
Oﬀ equilibrium path, if the oﬀers diﬀer, the external investors always select the
entrepreneurs who oﬀer the highest expected external investor surplus. By deﬁ-
nition we have κh > κl. We have already assumed that as a necessary condition
for an entrepreneurs to be able to commit to the proposed corporate governance
structure, in stage 2 the entrepreneur has to commit the promised insider equity.
Each entrepreneur maximizes the expected entrepreneurial surplus.
To characterize this equilibrium outcome, we begin by observing that the
symmetric equilibrium strategy of a start-up ﬁrm must satisfy the binding en-
trepreneurial wealth constraint and the binding corporate governance constraint,
i.e., ³
1 − ˜ θ
´
(κh)
β = ω, (54)
κl = ω1/β (55)
and
sh = θ. (56)
The proof is simple. Suppose otherwise, then an entrepreneur can always in-
crease the entrepreneurial equity input by ε1 → 0,o ri n c r e a s et h ee xp o s t
external investor bargaining power by ε2 → 0, and therefore increase the proba-
bility of winning external ﬁnance by a ﬁnite positive number (1 − φ), and hence
increase the expected entrepreneurial surplus by a ﬁnite amount. This is a
proﬁtable deviation, which contracts the above supposition.
Since the capital market is perfectly competitive, in equilibrium the external
investor surplus from each ﬁrm should be zero, i.e.,
θSπh (κh;κ−h)=˜ θ(κh)
β (57)
or
θSπh (κh;κ−h)=( κh)
β − ω (58)
20where κ−h denotes
¡
(κh)Nh−1 ,(κl)Nl
¢
. The binding entrepreneurial wealth con-
straint and the binding external investor participation constraint jointly imply
that even the successful high-capability ﬁrms still face binding credit constraints
and suﬀer from underinvestments from the ﬁrm-proﬁt-maximization point of
view. The unsuccessful low-capability ﬁrms obviously suﬀer an even worse un-
derinvestment problem.
In equilibrium, free entry leads to the following ex ante entrepreneurial
break-even condition:
φ(1 − θ)Sπh (κh;κ−h)+( 1− φ)Sπl (κl;κ−l)=ω. (59)
Although on average each entrepreneurial entrant breaks even, the fact that all
of them are willing to compete for obtaining external credits imply that the
entrepreneurs of the high-capability ﬁrms must be better oﬀ than those of the
low-capability ﬁrms in equilibrium, which further implies that the former must
earn a strictly positive surplus and latter must earn a strictly negative surplus,
i.e.,
(1 − θ)Sπh (κh;κ−h) > ω >S πl (κl;κ−l).
Given the fact that all external investors have zero surplus in equilibrium, it fol-
lows immediately that the high-capability ﬁrms earn strictly positive net proﬁts
and the low-capability ﬁrms make net losses. On average, each ﬁrm just breaks
even.
In the asymmetric equilibrium outcome, the credit rationing mechanism
comprises two sets of rules. The ﬁrst relates to credit denial to certain frac-
tion of ﬁrms. The second relates to credit-size rationing to the ﬁrms who are
not denied credits. The credit-size rationing rule diﬀers from the one adopted
in the symmetric equilibrium outcome, as is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 In comparison with the symmetric outcome22 with binding
credit constraints, each high capability ﬁrm in the asymmetric equilibrium out-
come obtains more credit and a higher level of capability, i.e.,
˜ θh > θ, (60)
and
κh > κb. (61)
Also, the number of high capability ﬁrms is smaller than the number of ﬁrms of
a symmetric outcome with binding credit constraints, i.e.,
Nh <N b. (62)
Proof. The entrepreneur of a high capability ﬁrm earns a strictly positive
surplus, i.e.,
(1 − θ)Sπh (κh;κ−h) −
³
1 − ˜ θh
´
(κh)
β > 0. (63)
22Which is not necessarily an equilibrium.
21Using eq. (57) and (63) to eliminate πh (κh;κ−h) and (κh)
β results in ˜ θh > θ.
From (47) and (54) it follows that
κh =
µ
ω
1 − ˜ θh
¶ 1
β
> κb =
µ
ω
1 − θ
¶ 1
β
. (64)
From the property that
Sπ
¡
κh;(κh)Nh−1
¢
= S
(κh)
2
(Nh +1 )
2 ≥ Sπ (κh;κ−h)=
˜ θh
θ
(κh)
β > (κh)
β ,
i.e., for given κh and Nh, if all the low-capability ﬁrms were removed from the
product market competition exogenously, then each high-capability ﬁrm would
be better oﬀ, it follows that
Nh <S
1
2 (κh)
2−β
2 − 1.
Since κh > κb and β > 2, it is immediate that
Nh <S
1
2 (κb)
2−β
2 − 1=Nb. (65)
The credit-size rationing rule is based on the expectation that the high-
capability ﬁrms can make positive net proﬁts. Even when there is free entry,
the high-capability ﬁrms’ positive net proﬁts are not eroded by competition
because the marginal competitors are the low-capability ﬁrms whose ability to
compete in R&D is constrained by credit denials. The external investors there-
fore are willing to take a bigger share of the cost of capital than the expected
share of proﬁt, i.e., ˜ θh > θ, up to the point that they just break even. This
more favorable credit-size rationing rule enables the high-capability ﬁrms to in-
vest more aggressively, i.e., κh > κb. In equilibrium, the credit denials to the
low-capability ﬁrms and the more favorable credit-size rationing rule toward the
high-capability ﬁrms reenforce each other. This asymmetric equilibrium credit
rationing mechanism creates an endogenous distinction between ‘deep-pocket’
(high-capability) and ‘shallow-pocket’ (low-capability) ﬁrms, and makes them
respectively the winners and losers of the R&D-product market competition.
It turns the R&D-product market competition into a ‘predation’ in the sense
that if the collapse of the ‘preys’, i.e., the low-capability ﬁrms’ external ﬁnances
were not expected (and intended), the ‘predators’, i.e., the high-capability ﬁrms’
business-corporate strategies would have been less aggressive.23 It is all high-
capability ﬁrms’ intention and the foundation of their business-corporate strate-
gies that the low-capability ﬁrms’ external ﬁnances should be destroyed (with or
without the consequence of them being driven out of the product market). As
a result, the high-capability ﬁrms can recoup the extra costs of their aggressive
investments.
23See Tong (2005a) for an extension of the same idea in a model of predatory pricing rather
than ‘predatory’ investment in R&D.
22The asymmetric equilibrium credit rationing mechanism creates winners
(‘predators’) and losers (‘preys’) among the entrepreneurs. Ex ante, upon decid-
ing on the optimal integrated business-corporate strategy, an entrepreneur has
to balance two elements: one is to maximize the entrepreneurial surplus condi-
tional on the contract being acceptable; the other is to maximize the chance of
the contract being selected. As a result of the competition for selective credit
allocation and free entry, the equilibrium outcome must exhaust all the oppor-
tunities of pledging positive external investor surplus, i.e., the external investor
surplus oﬀered by the equilibrium business-corporate strategy is at the global
maximum and equals zero. When this condition is satisﬁed, there is no prof-
itable (unilateral) deviation for any players. First, for an entrepreneur, changing
the asking size of external credit would only decrease the expected external in-
vestor surplus and hence destroy the chance of being selected, therefore is not
ap r o ﬁtable deviation. Consequently, external credit must either be of this par-
ticular size, or zero. Second, it is not a proﬁtable deviation for any group of
external investors to change the number of high-capability ﬁrms. More elabo-
rately, on the one hand, the external investors of a high capability ﬁrm would
not ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to quit since the surplus is still zero. On the other
hand, an outside group of external investors who have suﬃcient fund would ﬁnd
it unproﬁtable to turn a low capability ﬁrm into an additional high capability
one, because the intensiﬁed competition would make all external investors in the
market (including themselves) worse oﬀ, resulting in negative external investor
surplus.
If the proﬁtf u n c t i o nπi is continuously diﬀerentiable at the point (κh;κ−h),
then to rule out any proﬁtable local deviation (i.e., positive external investor
surplus), the following ﬁrst order necessary condition must be satisﬁed:
θS
∂πi
∂κi
= F0 (κi). (66)
Hence,
θ
∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
=
F0 (κi)κi
F (κi)
F (κi)
Sπi
= β
θ
˜ θi
It follows that
˜ θh
∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
κi=κh,κ−i=κ−h
= β. (67)
Using (54) and (67) to eliminate ˜ θh yields
Ã
1 −
ω
(κh)
β
!
∂πi
∂κi
κi
πi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
κi=κh,κ−i=κ−h
= β. (68)
If the proﬁtf u n c t i o nπi is not continuously diﬀerentiable at the point (κh;κ−h),
i.e., this point is a ‘kink’, then the slope to the immediate left (respectively, right)
of this ‘kink’ must be non-negative (respectively, non-positive), to ensure it is a
local maximum.
23In the asymmetric equilibrium outcome, the low-capability ﬁrms’ relation-
ships with the external investors are the victims of the ‘predation’. It is inter-
esting to know whether as a consequence the low-capability ﬁrms are driven out
of the product market competition. This hinges on whether it is optimal for a
low-capability ﬁrm to remain active, i.e., to maintain a positive market share. It
is possible that if the low capability is relatively too low, then the ﬁrm’s optimal
choice is not to produce at all at the third stage of the game.
Denote by m(κi;κ−i) the equilibrium market share of ﬁrm i. Eq. (3) implies
m(κi;κ−i)=m a x
Ã
0,
κi +
PN
j=1 (κi − κj)
PN
j=1 κj
!
. (69)
We look for a threshold of the high capability, call it the ‘limit capability’,
such that if the high capability ﬁrms all reach that level, a low capability ﬁrm will
have zero market share. More precisely, deﬁne the normalized ‘limit capability’
¯ κ(Nh) such that
m(κl;κ−l)|κl=ω1/β,κh=ω1/β¯ κ(Nh) =0 (70)
and
m(κl;κ−l)|κl=ω1/β,κh=ω1/β¯ κ(Nh)−ε > 0 (71)
for any ε > 0.F r o mt h ea b o v ed e ﬁnition, it follows that
¯ κ(Nh)=
µ
1+
1
Nh
¶
. (72)
There are three types of possible asymmetric equilibrium outcomes as far as
κh and m(κl;κ−l) are concerned:
Scenario 1: The low-capability ﬁrms are strictly active, i.e., κh < ω1/β¯ κ(Nh) and
m(κl;κ−l) > 0.
Scenario 2: The low-capability ﬁrms are weakly inactive, i.e., κh = ω1/β¯ κ(Nh) and
m(κl;κ−l)=0 .
Scenario 3: The low-capability ﬁrms are strictly inactive, i.e., κh > ω1/β¯ κ(Nh) and
m(κl;κ−l)=0 .
In scenario 1, a high-capability ﬁrm’s equilibrium strategy is featured in
Figure 1. Where the thick solid curve is the external investor surplus from a
high-capability ﬁrm as a function of its capability given other ﬁrms’ position in
the equilibrium outcome. The external investor surplus is at maximum, equal
to zero and continuously diﬀerentiable at κi = κh (for κi > ω
1
β). The thin solid
curve is the entrepreneurial surplus, which is increasing in κi (for κi > ω
1
β),
and is strictly positive at κi = κh. The equilibrium high capability level κh is
below is the ‘kink’, which is the level that would make the low-capability ﬁrms
weakly inactive. Obviously, in this equilibrium outcome all the low-capability
ﬁrms remain strictly active.
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Figure 1: Asymmetric equilibrium outcome with strictly active low capability
ﬁrms
In scenario 2, the external investor surplus, as shown in Figure 2, is maximal
(for κi > ω
1
β) at the ‘kink’, which is the level that makes the low capability
ﬁrms weakly inactive. In this equilibrium outcome all the low-capability ﬁrms
are weakly inactive.
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Figure 2: Asymmetric equilibrium outcome with weakly inactive low capability
ﬁrms (maximal external investor surplus at the ‘kink’)
In scenario 3, the external investor surplus, as shown in Figure 3, is maximal
(for κi > ω
1
β) above the ‘kink’, which is threshold that would make the low-
capability ﬁrms weakly inactive. Obviously, in this equilibrium outcome all the
low-capability ﬁrms remain strictly inactive.
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Figure 3: Asymmetric equilibrium outcome with strictly inactive low capability
ﬁrms
4.1 Low-capability ﬁrms driven out of product market
In this subsection we analyze Scenario 3 in greater detail. This scenario is
particularly interesting because here the ‘preys’, i.e., the low-capability ﬁrms,
are literally driven out of the product market by the ‘predation’. When the low
capability ﬁrms are strictly inactive, the proﬁt of a high-capability ﬁrm is given
by
Πh (κh;κ−h)=
S (κh)
2
(Nh +1 )
2. (73)
The ex ante entrepreneurial break-even condition (59) now takes the follow-
ing form:
φ
(1 − θ)S (κh)
2
(Nh +1 )
2 = ω. (74)
The binding external investors’ participation constraint (58) now has the
following implementation:
θ
S (κh)
2
(Nh +1 )
2 =( κh)
β − ω, (75)
which implies
Nh =
Ã
θS (κh)
2
(κh)
β − ω
! 1
2
− 1. (76)
Using eq. (74) and (75) to solve for φ yields
φ =
θ
1 − θ
ω
(κh)
β − ω
, (77)
26which is the fraction of entrepreneurs who are the winners.
In this scenario, the high capability level strictly exceeds the limit capability
level, i.e.,
κh > ¯ κ(Nh)ω1/β =
µ
1+
1
Nh
¶
ω1/β. (78)
The necessary condition (68) applies to this scenario and is implemented as
follows: Ã
1 −
ω
(κh)
β
!
2Nh = β. (79)
It follows that
Nh =
β (κh)
β
2
³
(κh)
β − ω
´ >
β
2
= Nnb. (80)
The binding external investors’ participation constraint (58) now takes the form
as
θ
S (κh)
2
(Nh +1 )
2 =( κh)
β − ω. (81)
Using Equations (79) and (81) to eliminate κh and Nh respectively results
in
θS
(Nh +1 )
2
Ã
ωNh
Nh −
β
2
!2/β
=
Ã
ωNh
Nh −
β
2
− ω
!
, (82)
and
θ
S (κh)
2
µ
β(κh)β
2((κh)β−ω) +1
¶2 =( κh)
β − ω, (83)
which imply the following set of comparative statics.
Proposition 11 In the asymmetric equilibrium outcome with strictly inactive
low-capability ﬁrms, the high capability κh increases with market size S and the
upper limit of external investors’ bargaining power θ, i.e., ∂κh
∂S > 0 and ∂κh
∂θ > 0.
The number of high capability ﬁrms Nh decreases with market size S and the
upper limit of external investors’ bargaining power θ, i.e., ∂Nh
∂S < 0 and ∂Nh
∂θ < 0.
The probability of being a high-capability ﬁrm, φ, decreases with market size S,
i.e.,
∂φ
∂S < 0.
Proof. Equations (82) and (83) imply the following comparative statics:
∂Nh
∂θ
= −
1
θ
NhA
,
∂Nh
∂S
= −
1
S
NhA
,
∂κh
∂θ
=
1
θ
κhA(2Nh − β)
,
∂κh
∂θ
=
1
θ
κhA(2Nh − β)
(84)
where A , 1+
β−2
2Nh−β − 2Nh
Nh+1. The equilibrium entails the following second
order necessary condition for maximization:
θ
∂2πi
∂κ2
i
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(κh,Nh)
− β (β − 1)(κh)
(β−2) ≤ 0, (85)
27which implies
∂2πi
∂κ2
i
κi
∂πi
∂κi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(κh,Nh)
≤ β − 1. (86)
Given the following property of the proﬁt function:
∂2πi
∂κ2
i
κi
∂πi
∂κi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(κh,Nh)
= Nh, (87)
it follows that the number of high capability ﬁrms is bounded from above by:
Nh ≤ β − 1, (88)
and the inequality below is satisﬁed.
A =1+
β − 2
2Nh − β
−
2Nh
Nh +1
>
2
Nh +1
> 0. (89)
As a result, we obtain deﬁnite signs for the comparative statics in (84) as follows:
∂Nh
∂S
< 0,
∂Nh
∂θ
< 0,
∂κh
∂S
> 0 and
∂κh
∂θ
> 0. (90)
From (77) it follows that
∂φ
∂S
=
∂φ
∂κh
κh
∂S
< 0. (91)
Conditional on the low-capability ﬁrms are strictly inactive, the larger the
market size, or the higher the upper limit of external investor protection, the
more favorable is the credit-size rationing toward the winners, i.e., the larger is
κh; and the smaller is the number of ﬁrms that receive external credits; hence
the tougher is the ‘predation’.
Now we look for the parametric condition under which the low-capability
ﬁrms become strictly inactive. We look for the boundary between scenario 2
and 3, denoted by SI (θ,ω), above which inequality (78) is satisﬁed and below
which this inequality is violated. Figure 4 depicts the the external investor
surplus function for S = SI (θ,ω): there is a kink at the equilibrium level of
high capability, particularly, the slope at the immediate right of the kink is ﬂat,
while it is upward at the immediate left of the kink.
When S = SI (θ,ω),t h e r ee x i s t s(κh,N h) which satisﬁes conditions (82),
(83) and κh =¯ κ(Nh)ω1/β.D e ﬁne rI , κh
ω1/β. It follows that
r
β
I − 1
rI − 1
=
β
2
r
β
I (92)
The solution exists and is unique for rI > 1.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,SI (θ,ω) is given
by
SI (θ,ω)=
ω1−2/β
θ
³³
β
2 +1
´
r
β
I − 1
´2
³
r
β
I − 1
´
r2
I
(93)
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Figure 4: Asymmetric equilibrium outcome with (almost) strictly inactive low-
capability ﬁrms (the threshold between scenarios 2 and 3)
Proposition 12 There exists a threshold value of S, SI (θ,ω),s u c ht h a tt h e
asymmetric equilibrium outcome with strictly inactive low-capability ﬁrms exists
if and only if S>S I (θ,ω).
Proof. (sketch) Let (N∗
h,κ∗
h) be the solution to eq. (82) and (83). When
S = SI (θ,ω),i nt h e(Nh,κh) space, the loci of (N∗
h,κ∗
h) intersects with the limit
capability curve: κh =
³
1+ 1
Nh
´
ω1/β. According to Proposition 11, when
S increases, the loci of (N∗
h,κ∗
h) moves to the northwest. On the one hand,
κ∗
h →∞as S →∞ . On the other hand the limit capability curve is bounded
from above by
³
1+ 1
Nnb
´
ω1/β since Nh ≥ Nnb. It follows that when S →∞
the loci of (N∗
h,κ∗
h) is above the limit capability curve. Given that the loci
of (N∗
h,κ∗
h) is continuous and it intersects with the limit capability curve only
once for κh > ω1/β (otherwise the solution to eq. (92) would not be unique),
then the loci of (N∗
h,κ∗
h) must stay above (below) the limit capability curve for
S>S I (θ,ω) (S<S I (θ,ω)). Therefore, inequality (78) is satisﬁed if and only
if S>S I (θ,ω).
4.2 Very large market: the limiting case
In this subsection, we study the behavior of equilibrium when the market size
S approaches inﬁnity, hence, where the ‘predation’ is the toughest. We are
particularly interested in the asymptotic behavior of variables: κh, Nh and φ.
Since κh increases with S, and approaches to inﬁnity as S approaches inﬁnity,
it makes more sense if we compare κh with the benchmark capability, κnb,w h i c h
also approaches inﬁnity, i.e., we calculate limS→∞
κh
κnb and relate it to parameter
θ.
29From eq. (83) it follows that
(κh)
β−2 −
ω
(κh)
2 =
θS
µ
β(κh)β
2((κh)β−ω) +1
¶2, (94)
which, as κh →∞ , has the approximated solution:
κh ≈



θS
³
β
2 +1
´2



1
β−2
. (95)
Hence,
κh
κnb
≈
µ
θS
(
β
2 +1)
2
¶ 1
β−2
µ
S
(
β
2 +1)
2
¶ 1
β−2
→ θ
1
β−2 as S →∞ (96)
From eq. (82), it follows
Nh =
β
2
+
ωNh
θS
(Nh+1)2
³
ωNh
Nh−
β
2
´2/β
+ ω
→ Nnb =
β
2
. (97)
This result is very interesting because it reenforces the ‘non-convergence’
result of Sutton (1991) and Sutton (1998), which says that in the ‘endogenous
sunk cost’ industries the k-ﬁrm market concentration measure is bounded away
from zero (even when the market size approaches inﬁnity). Here we ﬁnd that
the ‘non-convergence’ result can be extended to environment where there are
endogenous binding credit constraints on R&D investments. This result con-
ﬁrms that the ‘escalation mechanism’, as phrased by Sutton (1998), is indeed
one of the most robust a few mechanisms that determine of market structure.
What’s surprising is the ﬁnding of the connection between the ‘non-convergence’
property and the ‘predatory’ nature of some ‘endogenous sunk cost’ industries,
e.g., R&D intensive industries.
The probability for a start-up ﬁrm to become a high-capability ﬁrm ap-
proaches zero, i.e., φ → 0, as the market size approaches inﬁnity.
When the low-capability ﬁrms are strictly inactive, the ex ante ﬁrm break-
even condition entails that the total industry R&D expenditure equals the total
ex post proﬁt of all high-capability ﬁrms, which is given by
Nh
S (κh)
2
(Nh +1 )
2 → θ
2
β−2 β
2



S
³
β
2 +1
´2



β
β−2
= θ
2
β−2Nnb (κnb)
β , (98)
which is a fraction θ
2
β−2 of the level whereof there are no binding credit con-
straints. In contrast, the overall R&D investment would be much lower in a
30hypothetical symmetric outcome with binding credit constraints, as can be re-
vealed by following calculation:
lim
S→∞
Nb (κb)
β
Nnb (κnb)
β = lim
S→∞
S
−
β+2
2(β−2)
µ
ω
1 − θ
¶ β+2
2β 2
β
µ
β
2
+1
¶ β
2(β−2)
=0 . (99)
Therefore we can claim that, in the case of very large market, the ‘predatory’
asymmetric equilibrium outcome increases overall R&D investment as compared
to the symmetric outcome. As for market structure, using eq. (77), the number
of low-capability ﬁr m si sg i v e nb y
Nl =
µ
1
φ
− 1
¶
Nh =
Ã
1 − θ
θ
(κh)
β − ω
ω
− 1
!
Nh. (100)
Hence,
Nl →∞as S →∞ . (101)
Nevertheless, since the low capability ﬁrms’ collective market share is zero, the
entry of many low-capability ﬁrms do not reduce market concentration. As
market size goes to inﬁnity, predation and the selective credit allocation fully
restores market concentration to, but never exceeds, the level of the benchmark
case with no binding credit constraints. It limits the number of major R&D
investors, and allows the size of R&D investments (by the major R&D ﬁrms) to
increase. When selective credit denial (Type II credit rationing) occurs in big
markets, it impacts the market structure by generating ‘a lot of start-ups, and
a very few stars’. Its is an ingenious way of the markets to mitigate (but not
yet to eliminate) the problem of under-investment in R&D.
Proposition 13 W h e nt h es i z eo fm a r k e tS approaches inﬁnity, the number of
high-capability ﬁrms approaches the benchmark number Nnb, and the probability
of being a high-capability ﬁrm φ approaches zero, the high capability level κh
approaches inﬁnity, but still it is only a fraction θ
1
β−2 of the benchmark level
with no binding credit constraints; the number of high-capability ﬁrms approaches
from above the benchmark numbers of ﬁrms with no binding credit constraints;
the level of industry R&D approaches inﬁnity, but is still only a fraction θ
2
β−2 of
the benchmark level with no binding credit constraints, and is higher than that
in a hypothetical symmetric outcome with binding credit constraints.
A consistent moral lesson we can learn from Propositions 8 and 13 is that
the industry level of R&D investment increases with the level of upper limit of
external investor protection provided by the corporate governance system. This
suggests an important role played by the broader legal-political environment to
improve contract enforcement and corporate governance in relation to R&D and
technological progress.
315C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we develop a theory of the ﬁrms and equilibrium credit rationing
mechanism in oligopoly market with free entry. The theory departs from the
simplistic ‘black-box’ view of the ﬁrm, and characterizes the relationship be-
tween wealth-constrained entrepreneur-manager and the external investors of
the ﬁrm. It predicts that corporate investments may be subject to endogenous
credit constraints due to incompleteness of the investment contracts. A ﬁrm is
deﬁned by its integrated business-corporate strategy. To address the problem of
binding credit constraint, a ﬁrm’s equilibrium corporate governance structure
assigns maximal feasible external investor protection, which alleviates, but does
not eliminate, the problem.
The theory predicts two types of interaction between equilibrium credit-
rationing mechanism and industry structure. In a symmetric equilibrium out-
come all ﬁrms receive equitable credit-size rationing and each of them just breaks
even. In the asymmetric equilibrium outcome, the credit rationing mechanism
involves both credit denials to an unsuccessful fringe of ﬁrms, and more favor-
able credit size rationing to the winners of the selection. It creates an endoge-
nous distinction between the ‘deep-pocket’ and ‘shallow-pocket’ ﬁrms, turns the
competition into a ‘predation’, and sustains positive net proﬁts for the ‘deep-
pocket’ ﬁrms. In comparison with the symmetric equilibrium outcome with
binding credit constraints, the asymmetric equilibrium outcome increases the
skewness of ﬁrm size distribution, market concentration, and overall R&D in-
vestments. It constitutes a ‘market solution’ to the ‘funding gap’ problem. This
result suggests a novel interpretation for the stylized fact that some small high-
tech start-up ﬁrms are denied credits while bigger R&D ﬁrms are treated more
favorably by the capital market. According the our current theory, this kind of
discrimination may have an eﬃciency justiﬁcation: only by denying credits to
an unsuccessful fringe, is the capital market able to relax the rationing of credit
size for some major R&D competitors in equilibrium.
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